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Abstract 
 
In this article, based on both parametric and non-parametric methods, we provide a robust 
solution to the long-standing issue on how earnouts in corporate takeovers are structured and 
how their structure influences the takeover premia and the abnormal returns earned by 
acquirers. First, we quantify the effect of the terms of earnout contract (relative size and length) 
on the takeover premia. Second, we demonstrate how adverse selection considerations lead the 
merging firms to set the initial payment in an earnout financed deal at a level that is lower than, 
or equal to, the full deal payment in a comparable non-earnout financed deal. Lastly, we show 
that while acquirers in non-earnout financed deals experience negative abnormal returns from 
an increase in the takeover premia, this effect is neutralised in earnout financed deals. 
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1. Introduction 
Merging firms’ managers tend to employ earnout contracts to finance Mergers and Acquisitions 
(M&As) in which information asymmetry between the involved firms leads to substantial 
valuation disagreements over the deal’s outcome. Such information asymmetry is highly 
relevant in private target acquisitions due to the low information disclosure requirements 
concerning private firms (Officer et al., 2009).1 In an earnout financed deal, the selling firm 
receives only a part of the deal’s payment, i.e. the initial payment, at the time of the deal’s 
announcement. Under this arrangement, the receipt of the deferred payment is conditional on 
the satisfaction of pre-specified performance related goals within a pre-determined period, i.e. 
the earnout period.2 The small number of shareholders, and hence the lack of separation 
between ownership and control in private firms, offer the private target’s managers or owners 
an increased flexibility in negotiating unconventional forms of deal structuring like earnout 
financing (Kohers and Ang, 2000). Consequently, the reliance on earnout finacing has become a 
prominent characteristic of private target acquisitions in large takeover markets around the 
world like the United States (Datar et al., 2001; Cain et al., 2010) and the United Kingdom 
(Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam, 2012). 
Earlier studies show that earnout financing, relative to single-payment financing, 
contributes to the achievement of many objectives to the benefit of both merging firms (Kohers 
and Ang, 2000; Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam, 2012).3 Nevertheless, several important issues 
remain to be investigated to enhance our understanding of how earnouts are structured and 
how their structure affects the valuations of merging firms. Specifically, it remains to be 
                                                             
1 The private target firms’ managers or owners may have superior information about the values of the firms they 
manage, which gives rise to the adverse selection problem. The (un-observed) efforts of the merging firms’ managers 
towards the maximisation of the outcome of the merger in the post-merger period give rise to the moral hazard 
problem. 
2 The performance requirements may include specific thresholds related to the target firm’s earnings, sales, and 
various profitability measures (Datar et al., 2001). However, the settlement of the deferred payment in a minority of 
earnouts can be linked to the satisfaction of a non-performance-based requirement such as the regulatory approval of 
a particular drug or the future licensing of a particular project (Cadman et al., 2014). 
3 Evidence shows that such benefits are translated into higher short- and long-run abnormal returns for the acquirers 
shareholders (Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam, 2012) and higher offer-to-book values (premia) for the owners of the 
target firms (Kohers and Ang, 2000). The evidence that is reported by Kohers and Ang (2000) also suggests that 69% 
of the private target shareholders (36 out of 52 cases) gain managerial privileges in the acquiring firm after the end of 
the earnout period. 
 3 
investigated: (a) how the earnout terms (relative earnout size and length of earnout contract) 
influence the premia offered in earnout financed deals, (b) how the deal value is divided 
between an initial and a deferred payment and, (c) how the abnormal returns earned by 
acquirers responds to the premia offered in both earnout and comparable non-earnout financed 
deals. 
The answers to these questions are important for several reasons. First, given the 
heterogeneous nature of earnouts, the form of relationship between the earnout terms (i.e. size 
and length) and the premium offered in an earnout financed deal provides a useful guide 
regarding the association between the deal riskiness of success and the extent to which such 
risk is effectively shared between the merging partners. For example, in the presence of earnout 
financing, how much additional premium is required by the private target owners to accept the 
deferral of a larger part of the deal’s payment, perhaps for an even longer period, than the 
already agreed ones? Second, the merging firms would acknowledge additional guidance on 
how to divide the deal value between the initial payment and the deferred one in an earnout 
financed acquisition. For example, should the acquiring firm offer a high initial payment to the 
private target owners in order to motivate them to enter the deal? Alternatively, should the 
acquiring firm ensure that the initial payment remains low relative to some threshold, despite 
the offering of high premium? Third, the acquiring firm’s shareholders would favor a deeper 
understanding of how the market is processing information about the relatively high premia 
offered in earnout financed deals. Specifically, is the market interpreting the increase in the 
premia in earnout financed deals as a signal of overpayment, thus leading to lower acquirer 
abnormal returns? Alternatively, is the market interpreting such an increase in the premia as 
the result of a detailed contractual arrangement between the merging firms to address 
valuation disagreements without necessarily leading to the target overpayment but rather to a 
well-designed synergy-enhancing deal? 
In this paper, given the extensive use of earnouts in the UK market for corporate control 
(Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam, 2012), we rely on a UK-based dataset that covers private target 
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acquisitions in order to establish the link between the terms of earnouts and the difference 
between the takeover premia offered in earnout and comparable non-earnout financed deals. 
On the methodological front, we combine both non-parametric (matching) and parametric 
analyses to derive results that are robust to changes in the models’ specifications and functional 
forms. Moreover, given the scarcity of publicly available private-target-specific information, and 
in addition to the use of a unique hand-collected dataset that covers the target’s pre-acquisition 
performance, we employ the Rosenbaum (2002) bounds sensitivity analysis to measure the 
impact that a missing covariate should have on the odds of earnout use in the deal to alter our 
conclusions, as in Peel and Makepeace (2012). Several important and new results are 
uncovered. 
First, we find that the heterogeneity in the structure of earnouts is significantly related to 
the premia offered in earnout financed deals, relative to non-earnout financed ones. More 
specifically, an additional 10% increase in the relative earnout size is associated with, on 
average, a 6.45% higher premium.4 Moreover, our results indicate that a 1-month increase in 
the length of the earnout period is, on average, associated with a 0.6% higher premium. This 
evidence suggests that the private target owners are keen to ensure that the premia they are 
offered compensate them for: (a) sharing the post-merger integration risk with the acquirers, 
(b) offering their valuable services to facilitate the integration of the both firms during the 
earnout period and, (c) forgoing alternative valuable business and employment opportunities 
during this period. Overall, these results suggest that the magnitude of the target firm’s 
compensation (premia) is not homogenous across all earnout financed deals but is rather highly 
sensitive to the terms of each earnout contract. 
Second, while the previous studies have been primarily focused on examining the variation 
in the relative earnout size (Cain et al., 2011; Kohers and Ang, 2000), we show that, when 
designing an earnout contract, adverse selection considerations lead to a specific rule of thumb 
based on which the merging firms divide the deal payment between an initial and a deferred 
                                                             
4 The relative earnout size is the maximum size of the deferred payment, relative to the full deal value. 
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payment. Specifically, despite the offering of a higher premium in an earnout financed deal 
relative to a comparable non-earnout financed one, adverse selection considerations lead the 
acquiring firm to insist on setting the initial payment in an earnout financed deal at a level that 
is lower than, or equal to, the full deal payment in a comparable non-earnout financed deal. This 
finding contradicts the earlier univariate results derived by Kohers and Ang (2000) which 
indicate that even if the private target owners in an earnout financed deal do not receive the 
deferred payment, they still receive an initial payment that is higher than the full deal payment 
in a non-earnout financed deal (Kohers and Ang, 2000) (see their footnote 9, page 460). 
We emphasize the relevance of carefully interpreting the results from earlier research 
within the univariate framework in which they were generated. Specifically, in their important 
contribution that highlights the determinants and wealth effects of earnout financing, Kohers 
and Ang (2000) provided a limited discussion of these findings and did not employ a parametric 
regression analysis or a matching-based approach to further verify their conclusions. We argue 
that their conclusion that the targets in earnout financed deals receive higher initial payments 
than the full payments in non-earnout financed deals is exposed to concerns whether earnout 
financing, instead of addressing information asymmetry problems, creates its own ones. In 
particular, the target firm’s managers are incentivised to exaggerate the magnitude of valuation 
disagreements by limiting the information they are prepared to share with the acquirer. This 
aims to motivate the inclusion of the earnout in the deal’s financing process, which leads the 
private target owners to receive an initial payment that exceeds the full payment they would 
otherwise receive had the earnout not included in the deal’s financing process. 
Our findings that are based on the multivariate analysis of comparable earnout and non-
earnout financed deals suggest that the merging firms, and mostly the acquiring firms, are 
aware of such concerns. This, in turn, leads the acquirers to insist on adopting our previously 
mentioned rule of thumb as a condition to proceed with the earnout presence in the deal’s 
financing process. Overall, this rule limits the target managers’ incentives to exaggerate the 
extent of valuation disagreements in order to induce the use of the earnout as, otherwise, the 
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initial payment they receive remains considerably lower than, or at most equal to, the full 
single-payment in a non-earnout financed deal. 
Third, while the findings presented by earlier studies confirm that acquirers enjoy higher 
short-run abnormal returns from earnout financed, relative to non-earnout financed deals, we 
focus on the unexplored issues of: (a) the impact of the premia in earnout financed deals on the 
short-run abnormal returns gained by acquirers and, (b) the difference between the stock 
market’s assessments of the premia offered in earnout and non-earnout financed deals. An 
increase in the premia in non-earnout financed deals, which are comparable to earnout financed 
ones, as identified via the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) method, should be interpreted as a 
signal of overpayment. This interpretation should lead to lower short-run abnormal returns for 
acquirers shareholders (Alexandridis et al., 2013; Mueller and Sirower, 2003). However, if 
earnout financing allows the acquirer to hedge against the risk of overpayment, the negative 
relationship between the premia and acquirers short-run abnormal returns should be limited to 
only non-earnout financed deals. Our results are consistent with this view: the negative 
relationship between the premia and the abnormal returns gained by acquirers is fully 
neutralised in earnout financed deals, as evidenced by the insignificant effect of the premia on 
the acquirers abnormal returns. 
Finally, given the limited availability of private-target-specific information in the public 
domain, we interpret our results within the context of a sensitivity analysis that quantifies what 
impact a missing covariate should have on the likelihood of earnout financing presence to alter 
our conclusions. Our results that are insensitive to the effect of missing covariates are consistent 
with the argument that properly designed contractual arrangements (earnouts) contribute to 
the elimination of asymmetric information issues while enhancing the wealth effects of merging 
firms’ shareholders, provided that the merging firms’ managers are aware of the various types 
of risk-return trade-offs. 
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We proceed as follows: Section 2 sets our hypotheses; Section 3 presents our methodology; 
Section 4 presents our dataset; Section 5 discusses the empirical findings; Section 6 provides a 
sensitivity analysis, and finally Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses 
2.1. The impact of earnout financing on the premium 
The game-theoretic model of Lukas et al. (2012) predicts an increase in the premium when an 
earnout is included in the deal. Several explanations can be offered to justify this result. First, as 
the target firm often operates as a subsidiary of the acquiring firm during the earnout period 
(Kohers and Ang, 2000), its performance and hence the likelihood of receiving the deferred 
payment are affected by the acquiring firm’s overall business environment. As a result, the 
target firm demands a higher premium to be compensated for sharing the post-acquisition 
business risk with the acquirer. Second, the target owners can also be exposed to concerns 
related to possible disagreements with the acquiring firm regarding the accurate assessment of 
the target firm’s performance, which reduces the likelihood of receiving the deferred payment 
at the end of the earnout period (Datar et al., 2001). Such concerns, in turn, may lead the private 
target owners to demand higher premia in exchange of accepting the presence of the earnout in 
the financing process of the deal. 
Along these lines, Kohers and Ang (2000) show empirically that private targets in 
earnout financed deals are offered higher offer-to-book values than the targets in deals financed 
with single-payments. While such findings are based on a univariate analysis and obtained from 
analysing deals that are not necessarily comparable, they are likely to persist in our matched 
sample that consists of earnout and comparable non-earnout deals. Accordingly, our (H1) is 
stated as follows: The takeover premia in earnout financed deals are, on average, higher than the 
premia offered in comparable non-earnout financed deals. 
 
 
 8 
2.2. The relationship between the earnout terms and the premia 
A strong emphasis has been placed in the previous literature on the positive influence of both 
the riskiness of the target firm’s business environment and the knowledge-base of its human 
capital on the relative earnout size (Cain et al., 2011; Datar et al., 2001). However, the 
relationship between the relative size of the earnout payment and the premium has only been 
theoretically investigated within the context of the game-theoretic option-based model of Lukas 
at al. (2012). The authors argue that the optimal investment decisions are determined by 
solving recursively an option pricing problem. The third stage of this problem refers to the 
settlement of the earnout payment, its second stage refers to the determination of the optimal 
level of co-operation by the target, and its first stage refers to the timing of the deal and its 
structure. At the third stage, given that the earnout can be treated as an option that is written on 
the underlying target firm’s cash flows, the value of the option is identified. Based on this value, 
the target determines its optimal co-operation level. Finally, given this co-operation level, the 
acquirer determines the size of the earnout payment, the premium, and the timing of the deal. 
When the riskiness of the target firm’s cash flow increases, the probability of satisfying 
(by the target firm) the earnout’s performance requirements also increases. This is analogous to 
the increase in the probability of exercising a stock option when the stock’s riskiness increases. 
As a consequence, the target’s managers or owners incentive of co-operating during the earnout 
period is reduced and hence the synergies of the acquisition are likely to decrease. To avoid this 
outcome, the earnout payment must increase to incentivise higher synergies. Moreover, the 
model shows that the initial payment is determined by a Nash Bargaining game in which the 
parties divide the value of the total payoff. Given that the initial payment is a function of the 
payoffs that are due to a high earnout payment, the initial payment also increases but such an 
increase is lower than the increase in the deferred payment. Consequently, there is a positive 
relationship between the relative earnout size and the premium, as they both reflect the degree 
of the acquisition riskiness of success. Accordingly, our (H2a) is stated as follows: An increase in 
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the relative size of the earnout payment is associated with an increase in the premium that is 
offered in an earnout financed deal. 
The length of the earnout period, in turn, has the potential of being an influential 
determinant of the takeover premium. Given that the average earnout period exceeds 18 
months, and by holding all the other factors constant, time-value-of-money considerations 
should lead the announced deal value in an earnout financed deal –which covers both the initial 
payment and the maximum value of the deferred payment– to exceed the lump-sum deal 
payment in a comparable non-earnout financed deal. Along similar lines, the model proposed by 
Lukas and Heinmann (2014) suggests that with a pre-determined earnout payment the target 
firm’s owners are more inclined to accept earnout financing when the earnout period is 
relatively short in order to increase the value of their future cash flows. 
Nevertheless, in addition to this consideration, the private target owners need to be 
rewarded for offering their business expertise to the acquirer to facilitate the merging firms’ 
integration. Consequently, when offered a relatively long earnout period, the target owners are 
less likely to accept earnout financing unless the offered premium rewards them for both: (a) 
the business risk that they bear, and (b) the managerial skills that they offer to facilitate the 
merging firms’ integrations. Indeed, the comparative statics resulting from the Lukas et al. 
(2012) theoretical model indicate that long earnout periods are associated with high deal 
payments. As a result, we empirically test the Lukas et al. (2012) theoretical predictions by 
examining the significance of the positive relationship between the earnout period (i.e. length of 
earnout contract) and the premium. Accordingly, our (H2b) is stated as follows: The longer the 
earnout period the higher the premium that is offered in an earnout financed deal. 
 
2.3. Adverse selection considerations 
Datar et al. (2001) argue that ‘although earnouts may alleviate private information problems, 
these arrangements can also influence the incentives of the party managing the selling firm’s 
assets post-acquisition’ (p. 202). Hence, although earnouts are employed to address information 
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asymmetry concerns, they have the potential to create their own ones, particularly when they 
are not efficiently designed.5 We argue that the relationship between the initial payment in an 
earnout financed deal and the full deal payment in a non-earnout financed deal is exposed to 
critical adverse selection concerns. The only findings we are aware of addressing this 
relationship are based on the univariate analysis of Kohers and Ang (2000), which shows that 
the target firms in earnout financed deals receive initial payments that are larger, on average, 
than the full deal payments received by targets in non-earnout financed deals.6 
The adverse selection concern that emerges from these findings follows the argument 
that, as the target firm’s managers or owners are aware that they will be offered a higher initial 
payment compared to the full deal payment in a non-earnout financed deal, they are likely to 
exaggerate the extent of valuation disagreements to a level that unnecessarily leads to the 
inclusion of earnout. 
Contrary to the findings of Kohers and Ang (2000), which are based on: (a) univariate 
analysis and, (b) possibly a sample of non-comparable deals, adverse selection concerns should 
primarily incentivise the acquiring firm to insist on setting the initial payment at a level that is 
lower than, or equal to, the full deal payment in a comparable non-earnout financed deal. Such a 
contract design is likely to lead to an arrangement under which the target firm’s owners are less 
incentivised to exaggerate the magnitude of valuation disagreements to unnecessarily induce 
the inclusion of the earnout. Otherwise, they would receive a lower initial payment than, or at 
most an equal payment to, the full deal payment in a comparable non-earnout financed deal. 
Accordingly, our (H3) is stated as follows: The initial payment in an earnout financed deal is set to 
be, on average, at a lower level than, or equal to, the full deal payment in a comparable non-
earnout financed deal. 
 
 
                                                             
5 The effects of adverse selection on corporate acquisitions design have been thoroughly investigated by Reuer and 
Ragozzino (2008). 
6 The authors show that the average price-to-book value ratio in earnout financed deals, with the price excluding the 
deferred payment, exceeds the average price-to-book ratio in non-earnout financed deals (3.7>2.2). 
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2.4. Earnout financing, takeover premia, and acquirers’ abnormal returns 
The takeover premium has been employed in previous studies as a main determinant of the 
variation of the abnormal returns gained by acquirers (Hambrick and Hayward 1997; 
Alexandridis et al., 2013). Primarily, the market’s assessment of an increase in the premium can 
be explained by either: (a) the synergy hypothesis whereby a high premium is interpreted as a 
reflection of high synergies to be realised from the merger (Antoniou et al., 2008; Díaz et al., 
2009) or, (b) the over-investment hypothesis whereby a high premium is interpreted as a signal 
of managerial discretion and hubris that are leading the acquiring company’s board to be 
engaged in a wasteful acquisition (Mueller and Sirower, 2003; Roll, 1986).7 
The over-investment hypothesis can also explain the potential presence of high premia 
in private target deals (Cain et al., 2011; Capron and Shen, 2007; Datar et al., 2001; Kohers and 
Ang, 2000). Specifically, due to the limited availability of information about the private target’s 
performance (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005), the acquirer is likely to overpay for the combination 
of assets and managerial skills as information asymmetry prevents the accurate evaluation of 
these factors on the potential synergies of the deal. 
If earnout financing addresses a significant part of the information asymmetry problem, 
such a likelihood of overpayment should vary significantly between earnout and non-earnout 
financed deals. Specifically, for comparable deals, one would anticipate the market to negatively 
interpret the increase in the takeover premia that are offered in non-earnout financed deals in 
which earnout financing is likely to be included. Such a negative relationship should not persist 
when earnout financing is used, despite the offering of relatively high premia. This 
neutralisation of the negative effect of the premium on acquirers abnormal returns is due to the 
role of earnouts in addressing information asymmetry concerns. Following this discussion, our 
                                                             
7 The literature reports mixed results regarding the effect of the takeover premia on the abnormal returns gained by 
acquirers. Hambrick and Hayward (1997) and Mueller and Sirower (2003) find that premia have a negative effect on 
the acquirers gains. Alexandridis et al. (2013) find that the premium estimated using the piecewise regressions, 
based on the target’s stock 52-week high, has a statistically and economically significant negative effect on the 
acquirers gains. Antoniou et al. (2008) find a positive effect of the premia on acquirers short-run gains. This effect is 
not reversed in the long-run. Díaz et al. (2009) document a non-linear relationship between the premia and acquirers 
gains: initial increases of the premia are treated as signals of synergies, leading to higher acquirers gains. Later 
increases in the premia are treated as signals of over-investment and hence acquirers are penalised by the market. 
 12 
(H4) is stated as follows: The negative effect of the premia on the abnormal returns gained by 
acquirers in non-earnout financed deals is neutralised in comparable earnout financed deals. 
 
3. Methods 
In response to the growing popularity of matching analysis in empirical research, Ho et al. 
(2007) argue that matching in itself is not an estimation method: once a matched sample 
(containing the treated and control units) is established, an estimation procedure needs to be 
adopted to determine the factors influencing the treatment’s outcome. The authors recommend 
that the researchers benefit from ‘their decades of experience with parametric models to adjust 
the matched sample’ (p. 213). Particularly, the matching on propensity scores is primarily used 
to balance the main covariates by simple t-tests on the matched sample (Rosenbaum and Rubin 
1983). Then, parametric methods can be applied on the matched sample. 
The previously discussed two-step approach provides results that are likely to be less 
dependent on the model’s specification and functional form. First, regarding the model’s 
specification, Ho et al. (2007) point out that the two-stage approach is doubly robust: either the 
matching model or the parametric model need to be correctly specified, but not necessarily 
both. Such an approach provides more flexibility to address our research question compared to 
the strict requirement of correct specification when parametric methods and matching are used 
separately. Second, regarding the functional form that is adopted in the model, King and Zeng 
(2005) show that, by dropping observations that have no matches, the researcher not only 
reduces the degree of model dependence, but also needs to add less emphasis on non-linear 
relations and interactions among the explanatory variables. In advocating the use of parametric 
regressions, Ho et al. (2007) do not recommend a change in the computations of the standard 
errors from the procedures typically used for the particular parametric method adopted. 
Consequently, we first employ Propensity Score Matching (PSM) (as in Dehejia and 
Wahba, 2002; Behr and Heid, 2011; Peel and Makepeace, 2012) to create a matched sample that 
includes comparable earnout financed and non-earnout financed deals. Subsequently, we apply 
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parametric estimation methods on the matched sample and proceed with the testing of the 
hypotheses developed in Section 2. 
Based on the estimated probabilities from a Logistic model that includes a rich set of 
dichotomous and continuous covariates, earnout and non-earnout financed deals that have 
close estimated propensity scores are matched. Given that the number of earnout financed 
(treated) deals exceeds the number of non-earnout financed (control) deals in our sample, we 
rely on matching with replacement whereby a control observation can be used more than once, 
as in Dehejia and Wahba (2002). To benefit from the balancing offered by caliper matching (CM) 
while maintaining a considerable number of degrees of freedom to estimate the parametric 
models, we employ the highest possible matching caliper that leads to the balancing of the main 
covariates while maintaining the highest possible number of control observations. Then, we 
apply standard parametric analysis on the matched sample while controlling for the effects of 
the balanced variables, in addition to time and industry effects.8 
An underlying assumption of the previously mentioned approach is that the main source of 
bias that the researcher is addressing is the one due to ‘selection on observables’ (Heckman and 
Robb, 1985). That is, it is assumed that the set of covariates that are balanced through the 
matching model and included in the parametric estimations include all the relevant factors. In a 
research field such as ours that involves private target acquisitions where target-specific 
information is rarely publicly available, the quantification of the effect of a missing covariate on 
the resulting conclusions remains critical. To accommodate for this concern, we employ the 
Rosenbaum-bounds sensitivity analysis via which the least biased estimation of propensities is 
obtained. Specifically, the Rosenbaum-bounds sensitivity method measures the impact that a 
missing covariate should have on the odds of earnout presence as the financing method in a 
given acquisition to alter our qualitative conclusions, as in Peel and Makepeace (2012). A more 
detailed discussion on the Rosenbaum-bounds method is offered in Section 6. 
 
                                                             
8 The matching and parametric analyses are conducted based on algorithms developed by Ho et al. (2006). 
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4. Data and Sample Features 
4.1. The dataset 
Our sample covers acquisitions involving private target firms that are announced between 
January 1996 and December 2010 (inclusive) and recorded by the Securities Data Corporation 
(SDC) Thomson ONE database.9 For a deal to remain in our sample, it must satisfy the following 
selection criteria: (a) the acquirer is a UK public firm listed in the London Stock Exchange and 
has a market value of at least £1m four weeks prior to the announcement of the deal; (b) the 
target is a UK or a non-UK private firm; (c) the transaction value should be at least £1m, 
excluding fees; and (d) the acquirer should aim to control at least 50% of the target firm’s assets 
after the transaction. Furthermore, to avoid the inseparable effects of multiple deals on 
acquirers gains, deals that announced by same acquirer within 5 days (i.e. the event window 
analysed) are excluded from our sample. 
Following Officer's (2007) observation that ‘acquisition multiple data from SDC is missing 
or inaccurate, and this data is critical to inferring the acquisition discount for unlisted targets’ 
(p. 579), we search in the acquisition announcements from Nexis-UK and the InvestEgate 
Financial Press to obtain target-related measures that the acquiring firms have reported to their 
shareholders. We find that the acquirers are often report the target firm’s pre-acquisition 
Audited Profits Before Taxes (PBT). We obtain 445 deals for which the PBT is available. After 
excluding deals in which the target has negative PBT (as it makes the calculation of the 
acquisition multiple economically inaccurate), 424 deals remain in our sample (299 earnout 
financed deals and 125 non-earnout financed deals).10 
 
4.2. Sample statistics 
Table 1 (Panel A) records the annual distribution of our sample according to the deal’s payment 
type and method. The same table also records the annual distribution of our sampled deals in 
                                                             
9 The choice of the starting date follows from the observation of Faccio et al. (2006) that the SDC coverage of deals 
outside the United States becomes more accurate after 1996. 
10 This sample represents 15.9% of the original sample of 2,797 observations. Such a percentage level is close to the 
level of 15.15% reported by Officer et al. (2009) who also deal with the inclusion of unlisted target-specific 
accounting measures in their sample. 
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which: (a) the acquirer aims to control 100% of the target (FULL) and, (b) the target firm is a 
foreign firm (CBA). In our sample the earnout is the most frequent financing method (70.5% of 
the transactions) followed by acquisitions financed via single-payments in cash (CASH) (18.9%). 
(Insert Table 1 about here) 
Table 1 (Panel B) reports the annual distribution of our sampled deals according to the 
target firm’s industrial sector. Private firms based in the Consumer Products and Services (CPS) 
sector are more often involved in acquisitions covered in our sample (24.5%), followed by 
private firms in the High-Technology (HT) sector with a share of 22.1%. On the contrary, the 
target sectors with the lowest acquisition activity in our sample are the Energy and Power 
(EPW) with a share of 0.7% and the Real Estate (RST) with a share of 0.94%. Moreover, 
consistent with earlier studies (i.e. Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam, 2012), our summary statistics 
suggest that the use of earnout financing is more likely in acquisitions involving targets from 
service-related sectors in which the value of the firm is highly sensitive to the knowledge, skill 
and creativity of only a few personnel. For example, earnouts are more frequently used in 
financing private target acquisitions in the Media and Entertainment (88%), Healthcare (86%) 
and the High Technology (82%) sectors. 
The absence of target market value in private target deals makes the estimation of the 
premia offered in such deals a relatively challenging task. Kohers and Ang (2001) present the 
offer price-to-book value of equity ratio as the best available premium measure. However, Ball 
and Shivakumar (2005) emphasize the low quality of financial data reported by private firms. 
As a result, we rely on the target performance measure that the acquirer -after accessing the 
target’s records- has reported in the acquisition announcement, which is the target’s positive 
Audited Profits Before Taxes (POSPBT). This allows for the calculation of the premium 
(PREMIUM), which is the outcome of the division of the deal payment, covering the initial 
payment and the deferred payment if the earnout is used, by the target’s pre-acquisition 
profitability (PBT), as in Officer (2007) and Officer et al. (2009). 
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Table 2 reports the mean and median of PREMIUM in addition to other key variables 
included in our analysis. Among the sample statistics recorded in Table 2, the mean (median) of 
PREMIUM in earnout financed deals is 39.27 (11.75), which is higher than the corresponding 
one offered in non-earnout financed ones (25.11 (8.82)). We also show that the acquirers 
engaging in earnout financed deals are younger and smaller, on average, than the ones engaged 
in single-payment deals. Such results are consistent with findings from previous research 
indicating that such acquirers are more vulnerable to the consequences of target valuation risk 
and hence are more likely to rely on deferred payments to maximise the likelihood of the deal’s 
success (Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam, 2012; Kohers and Ang, 2000).11 
(Insert Table 2 about here) 
Regarding the terms of earnout contracts, we find that the mean (median) of the size of the 
earnout payment, as a percentage of the full deal value (REAS), of 36% (32%) is similar to the 
summary statistics reported by Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam (2012), 38% (35%). Regarding 
the length of the earnout contract (LENGTH), we report an average (median) value of 19.8 (19) 
months. This is lower than the one of 31 (23) month periods reported by Cain et al. (2011). Yet, 
it is close to the levels of 21.86 (22) months reported in Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam (2012). 
 
5. Results and Discussion 
5.1. The balancing of the main covariates 
To ensure that the effect of selection bias on the comparative analysis of the premia and the 
abnormal returns gained by acquirers between earnout and non-earnout financed acquisitions 
is reduced, we employ the PSM method to match single-payment deals to those that have been 
financed with earnout.12 The PSM is a multi-step method consisting the estimation of propensity 
                                                             
11 The anonymous reviewer suggested that the young age of earnout acquirers in our sample might be driven by the 
high frequency of high technology (HT) firms. The firms in the HT sector are more likely to be young relative to 
companies in other sectors. In unreported estimations, we confirm the reviewer’s prediction and find that the effect 
of the acquirer’s age on the likelihood of earnout financing is driven by the presence of HT acquirers in the sample. 
These estimations are available from the authors upon request. 
12 Unfortunately, matching directly on individual covariates becomes infeasible if the number of covariates is large. 
Consequently, we utilise the PSM approach along with the Rosenbaum-bounds method. This approach allows us to 
aggregate the impact of all covariates to derive a single score using a likelihood function. 
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scores for earnout and non-earnout deals via a logistic regression and the matching of the 
earnout deals’ propensity scores to the propensity scores of non-earnout financed deals. Our 
PSM aims to balance a large set of influential covariates with a caliper of 0.25. 
In addition to balancing the overall level of profitability level of the private targets 
between earnout and non-earnout financed deals on the matched sample, we also balance the 
percentage of the deal payment financed with stock (STOCK_PERC) in order to reflect the 
possible trade-off between stock and earnout financing,13 given that they have contingent 
payment properties (Chang 1998; Dataret al., 2001; Officer et al., 2009).14 To emphasize the 
importance of balancing the portions of domestic and cross-border acquisitions in the matched 
sample, we also include in our estimations a dichotomous variable (CBA) that is assigned the 
value of 1 if the target is a non-UK firm, and 0 otherwise. Noting that cultural and societal values 
can be a strong factor influencing the post-acquisition integration process especially in CBA, we 
also employ a Culture Index (CULT_IND) that allows us to balance the influence of cultural 
heterogeneity between the merging firms on the challenges faced during the integration 
process. This index is based on the graphical presentation presented by Radebaugh et al. (2006) 
which, in turn, is based on the traditional classification of country groups by cultural and 
societal values by Gray (1988). High values of CULT_IND indicate that the target firm belongs to 
a group of countries that focuses less on flexibility and more on uniformity in dealing with the 
accounting and organisational issues that might arise in a takeover, compared to the UK. Along 
these lines, the use of contractual tools that require precise measurement of the target 
performance, such as earnout financing, become less feasible. This variable is defined in 
Appendix 1. We also account for the acquirer experience in engaging in many acquisitions, as 
well as in assessing synergies, integrating targets, and evaluating the success of acquisitions in 
general, by controlling for the presence of frequent acquirers (FREQ) in our analysis. Moreover, 
                                                             
13 When the target firm’s owners receive the acquiring firm’s stock as part of the deal’s payment, the value of this 
payment increases with the increase in the acquiring firm’s stock price following the improvement in performance of 
the joint firm. 
14 We recognise that this measure is based on the deal value which is an outcome variable. Hence, in alternative 
estimations, instead of STOCK_PERC, we employ a dummy variable that is assigned the value of 1 if stock-financing is 
present, and 0 otherwise. The findings remain qualitatively similar to the ones reported. 
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we balance the continuous variables representing the acquirer size (market value, MV) and 
acquirer age (AGE). 
To ensure that the targets in the matched sample are similar in size with respect to their 
acquirers, we balance the dichotomous variable DUMMYRS, which is assigned the value of 1 if 
the relative size of the deal value to the acquirer market value exceeds 17%, which is the third 
quartile in our initial SDC sample, and 0 otherwise. Given that the deal value is an output 
variable and hence it should not be included as a covariate in the matching procedure (Smith 
and Todd, 2005), the use of DUMMYRS that allows us to balance the percentages of relatively 
large targets in the matched sample between earnout and non-earnout financed deals without 
necessarily balancing the deal value. Hence, the PSM method ensures that the matched sample 
involves private target deals with targets being relatively similar to each other in terms of size 
and performance levels. 
Table 3 records statistics on the balancing of the main covariates included in our analysis 
between the treated (earnout) and control group (non-earnout). This sample covers 299 
earnout financed deals and 87 comparable non-earnout financed deals (386 deals in total). 
Evidently, all covariates are balanced between the two groups, which provides a strong 
indication of an accurate matching. These covariates, in addition to year and industry fixed 
effects, are included in our multivariate approach when we analyse of our matched sample. 
(Insert Table 3 about here) 
 
5.2. Multivariate analysis of the premium 
Evidence recorded in Table 4 offers strong support to the argument that the presence of 
earnout financing, relative to its absence, leads to higher premia. Consistent with our hypothesis 
H1, and based on the interpretation of dummy variables in semi-logarithmic models that is 
offered by Kennedy (1981), the acquisition multiple in earnout financed deals is 31.11% higher 
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than its equivalent in non-earnout counterparts.15 Consistent with H2a, Model 2 shows that the 
relative size of the deferred payment (REAS) has a significant positive association with the 
offered premium: a 10% increase in the relative size of the earnout payment is, on average, 
associated with 6.45% increase in the offered premium. In turn, as suggested by H2b, the length 
of the earnout period (LENGTH) has a qualitatively similar effect on the premia. Specifically, a 
one-month increase in the length of the earnout period is associated with only 0.6% increase in 
the premium. 
(Insert Table 4 about here) 
Despite the arguments developed in earlier studies that the use of earnout financing is 
the initial step to establish a long term employer-employee relationship between the acquiring 
firm and the target’s owners or managers (Datar et al., 2001), it appears that the merging firms 
are keen to separate the takeover considerations from the employment- and organisational-
related ones. Specifically, our results add strong emphasis on the argument that the target firm’s 
owners prefer the acquisition contract to explicitly recognise their compensation for bearing a 
significant portion of the post-acquisition integration risk and also for forgoing valuable 
alternative business or employment opportunities during the earnout period. 
 
5.3. The structure of the earnout payment 
To investigate the difference between the initial payment in earnout financed deals and the full 
deal payments in comparable non-earnout financed deals, we modify our approach adopted in 
Section 5.2 by introducing the following dependent variable: 
 
INITIALDV = {
ln (
INITIALPMT
POSPBT
)  in earnout financed deals
ln (
DV
POSPBT
)  in non − earnout financed deals
 (1) 
Employing the INITIALDV as the dependent variable allows for the estimation of the 
premium based on the assumption that, in earnout financed deals, the deal payment is limited to 
                                                             
15 Based on the interpretation offered by Kennedy (1981), if the coefficient associated with a dummy variable in a 
semi logarithmic equation is 𝑐, the percentage impact of this variable on the outcome is 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑐 − 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑐)) − 1. 
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the initial payment (INITIALPMT), i.e. the deferred payment is not delivered. The sign, 
magnitude, as well as significance of the coefficient associated with the dummy variable 
referring to the presence of the earnout (EA) in a regression over the matched sample, with 
INITIALDV being the dependent variable, allows us to examine the difference between the initial 
payments in earnout financed deals and the full deal payments in comparable non-earnout 
financed ones, relative to the target’s pre-acquisition profitability. 
Table 5 (Model 1) shows that, after controlling for several covariates over the matched 
sample, the initial payment in earnout financed deals is found to be significantly smaller than 
the full deal values in comparable non-earnout financed ones. This effect remains significant, yet 
at the 10% level, when time and industry effects are included in Model 2. Based on the 
interpretation of dummy variables in semi-logarithmic models that is offered by Kennedy 
(1981), the initial payment in an earnout financed deal is, on average, 21.10% lower than the 
full deal payment in a comparable non-earnout financed deal. Such findings lead to the non-
rejection of H3 and highlight the importance of the hypothesised rule of thumb in dividing the 
deal payment between an initial payment and a deferred one. 
(Insert Table 5 about here) 
This finding provides a strong suggestion that the acquiring firms are aware of the 
adverse selection distortions that may arise from systematically committing to making 
significantly high immediate payments in earnout financed deals. Hence, despite the offer of 
high premia in earnout financed deals, the careful design of the initial and deferred payments to 
ensure the target firm’s co-operation appears to be an important condition for those firms to 
proceed with the transaction. 
 
5.4. The determinants of abnormal returns earned by the acquirers' shareholders 
In Models 1 (Table 6) we investigate the determinants of the abnormal returns gained by 
acquirers by introducing the presence of earnout financing as an independent variable. 
Consistent with previous evidence presented by Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam (2012), our 
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findings highlight the positive market response to the presence of earnout financing. 
Specifically, controlling for known determinants,16 earnout financed deals yield, on average, 
2.2% higher Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) than non-earnout financed ones.17 
To determine whether the market reacts differently to the premium level when the 
earnout is included compared to acquisitions in which the earnout is not included, we add 
PREMIUM and the product (EA × PREMIUM) as additional regressors in Model 2. Based on this 
specification, the coefficient associated with PREMIUM represents the market’s sensitivity to the 
premia in non-earnout financed deals. In turn, the sum of the coefficients associated with 
PREMIUM and (EA × PREMIUM) represents the market assessment’s sensitivity to the premia 
offered in earnout financed deals. According to our H4 the coefficient associated with PREMIUM 
is expected to be negative and the coefficient associated with (EA × PREMIUM) is expected to be 
positive, with an absolute value equal to that of the coefficient of PREMIUM. 
(Insert Table 6 about here) 
The results recorded in Model 2 indicate, as hypothesised in our H4, the two new relations 
that emerge between the variables PREMIUM and CAR. The first is negative, which is due to the 
absence of earnout financing. Specifically, as expected in non-earnout financed deals, an 
increase in the premium is interpreted negatively. However, the second relationship is positive 
with a magnitude being close in absolute value to the previous relation.18 The null hypothesis 
being the restriction that the coefficient associated with (EA × PREMIUM) is equal to the 
opposite value of the coefficient associated with PREMIUM is not rejected by a Wald test with a 
p-value of 0.77. The sum of both coefficients is not statistically different than 0, which indicates 
that the market’s sensitivity to the premium in earnout financed deals is statistically 
                                                             
16 For industry and year effects, we include dummy variables that refer to each sector covered in the sample and each 
year, respectively. For cross-industry effects, we include a dummy variable that is assigned the value of 1 if the 
merging firms have different 2-digit SIC codes, and 0 otherwise. 
17 As in Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002) and Faccio et al. (2006), we estimate the Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
(CAR) as the sum of the daily differences between the acquiring firm’s stocks returns and the returns on a market 
index (the FT-ALL Share Index in particular) in the 5-day period (-2, 2) surrounding the acquisition’s announcement 
date. 
18 In alternative estimations, we include ln(PREMIUM) instead of PREMIUM as an independent variable. Our findings 
remain qualitatively similar to the ones reported when it comes to signs of the coefficients. However, the effects in 
these alternative estimations are not significant. Therefore, our findings indicate that the relation between the premia 
in earnout financed deals and non-earnout financed ones on one hand and the acquirer’s CAR on another hand are 
linear. 
 22 
insignificant. Moreover, the distinction we present between the premium’s influence on CAR in 
earnout and non-earnout financed deals explains the overall positive wealth effect of this 
financing method as it renders the coefficient of EA insignificant in the specification presented. 
Overall, the insignificant relationship between the acquirers CAR to the level of the premia 
in earnout financed deals indicates that the offered premia in such deals, despite being 
relatively higher than the premia offered in comparable non-earnout financed deals, carries no 
implication on whether the target firm is overpaid. Rather, this premium is interpreted by the 
market as the outcome of detailed bargaining process that aims to ensure the completion of the 
deal by addressing the valuation disagreements between the merging partners. 
 
6. Sensitivity Analysis 
In the approach adopted in Section 5, we used matching analysis with the highest possible 
caliper to retain the highest number of comparable observations. Then, we applied parametric 
analysis on the resulting sample. In this Section, we add further emphasis on the validity of our 
results: (a) by using a smaller caliper to make the deals even more comparable, (b) by 
estimating the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT), which is the average difference 
in outcomes between the treated and the control observations on the matched sample and, (c) 
by applying a sensitivity analysis on the resulting ATT to quantify the effect that a missing 
covariate should have on the presence of the treatment to alter our conclusions. Rosenbaum 
(2002) developed a sensitivity analysis that can accompany the use of PSM. In particular, while 
PSM remains a method that addresses ‘selection on observables’ (Heckman and Robb, 1985), 
the Rosenbaum sensitivity analysis answers the question: how strong a missing covariate would 
have to be, in terms of influencing the odds of assigning a treatment, in order to alter the 
qualitative conclusions of the study? 
In the context of our analysis, this approach can be applied to our results related to the non-
rejection of H1 and H3 in Section 5. Specifically, to what extent can we be confident, or how 
confident can we be, that: (a) the increase in premia in earnout financed deals relative to non-
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earnout financed deals and, (b) the argument that ‘the initial payment in an earnout financed 
deal is lower than, or equal to, the full payment in a comparable non-earnout financed deal’ can 
hold with the introduction of a missing covariate? These examinations are relevant given that a 
large amount of private-target-related information is not publicly available to be introduced to 
the analysis in the form of covariates that influence the use of earnout financing. 
We write the odds of including an earnout in deal 𝑖, conditional on the set of empirical 
covariates 𝑊 that we employ in our analysis, as: 
 𝑃𝑖(𝐸𝐴 = 1|𝑊)
1 − 𝑃𝑖(𝐸𝐴 = 1|𝑊)
 (2) 
and for the deal 𝑗 that is matched to 𝑖 as: 
 𝑃𝑗(𝐸𝐴 = 1|𝑊)
(1 − 𝑃𝑗(𝐸𝐴 = 1|𝑊))
 (3) 
Rosenbaum (2002) introduces the parameter 𝛤 in the following relation: 
 
1
𝛤
≤
𝑃𝑖(𝐸𝐴=1|𝑊)
1−𝑃𝑖(𝐸𝐴=1|𝑊)
𝑃𝑗(𝐸𝐴=1|𝑊)
(1−𝑃𝑗(𝐸𝐴=1|𝑊))
≤ 𝛤 (4) 
Mainly, when 𝛤 = 1, the assignment of earnout between the two matched units is 
equivalent to a random assignment. As the value of 𝛤 increases, the assignment of the earnout 
no longer remains a random procedure. As shown by Rosenbaum (2002), the fraction of odds 
can be written as: 
 𝑃𝑖(𝐸𝐴=1|𝑊)
1−𝑃𝑖(𝐸𝐴=1|𝑊)
𝑃𝑗(𝐸𝐴=1|𝑊)
(1−𝑃𝑗(𝐸𝐴=1|𝑊))
=
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑘(𝑊) + 𝛾𝑢𝑖)
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑘(𝑊) + 𝛾𝑢𝑗)
= 𝑒𝑥𝑝{𝛾(𝑢𝑖 − 𝑢𝑗} (5) 
𝛾 ≥ 0 where 𝑘(𝑊) represents the effects of the observed covariates. 𝑢𝑖 and 𝑢𝑗 are the 
unobserved covariates influencing the presence of earnout financing in deals 𝑖 and 𝑗 
respectively. 𝛾 represents the influence of these covariates on the decision to include the 
earnout. Normalising 𝑢 = 𝑢𝑖 − 𝑢𝑗 between 0 and 1, 𝛤 can be written as 𝛤 = 𝑒
𝛾 and a straight 
forward interpretation is that the matched deals may differ in their odds of including an earnout 
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by at most 𝛤 (Rosenbaum 2002). Along these lines, 𝛾 can be interpreted as the coefficient 
associated with the missing covariate 𝑢 in a Logistic regression. 
Our results reported in Table 7, based on PSM with a caliper of 0.01 and the Logistic model 
specification as in Table 3, present inferences that are in line with conclusions of Section 5.19 
These inferences are very insensitive to the effect of a missing covariate. In particular, our ATT 
estimate of ln(PREMIUM) is 47.23% and is significant at the 1% level.20 In turn, the ATT 
estimate of the impact of earnout on INITIALDV is insignificant. Hence, the initial payment in an 
earnout financed deal is not statistically different than the full deal payment in a comparable 
non-earnout financed one. Based on 𝛤 levels of the Rosenbaum (2002) sensitivity analysis, a 
missing covariate need to increase the odds of one of two matched deals, including the earnout 
relative to the control from the non-earnout group, by a factor of 1.5 to 2 in order to: (a) make 
the impact of the earnout’s presence on the premium statistically insignificant and, (b) make the 
difference between the initial payment in an earnout financed deal and the full payment in a 
non-earnout financed one positive and statistically significant.21 
(Insert Table 7 about here) 
The 𝛤 levels of 1.5 and 2 that we report are close, for instance, to the level of 1.55 that is 
reported in the Peel and Makepeace (2012) study of the premium received by accounting 
auditors. Furthermore, in our Logistic model, these effects are equivalent to a required 
reduction in the portion of the deal that is financed by stocks from 57% and 34%, respectively, 
to 0, i.e. to employ full cash financing in order to alter our qualitative conclusions. These 
reductions reflect strong economic effects given that the standard deviation of the percentage of 
the deal financed by stocks is 23%. Following the emphasis of Core (2010) that results in 
empirical accounting and finance research are not frequently supported by sensitivity analyses, 
                                                             
19 The key covariates are balanced on the resulting matched sample as in Table 3. This matched sample covers 135 
earnout financed deal and 64 non-earnout financed ones. 
20 Abadie and Imbens (2008) show that estimators resulting from bootstrap procedures are not valid even under the 
simple conditions of a single continuous covariate and an unbiased 𝑁1/2 normally distributed estimator. The results 
of the Abadie and Imbens (2008) simulation show that the variance estimator they developed (Abadie and Imbens, 
2006) tends to perform well even with small samples. Consequently, in testing the null hypothesis of zero ATT, the 
Abadie and Imbens (2006) standard errors are employed in the t-tests and reported with the results. 
21 These results are based on the Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test at each 𝛤 level. 
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our results provide a clear indication that our conclusions are relatively insensitive to the effect 
of a missing covariate on the odds of the earnout’s presence in the financing process of the deal. 
 
7. Conclusion 
By employing an exclusive sample of UK private target acquisitions, this article presents the first 
empirical contribution that: (a) defines the relationship between the terms of the earnout 
contract (relative earnout size and length of earnout contract) and the premia offered in private 
target deals that are financed with earnouts and, (b) accounts for the earnout impact on the 
relationship between the premia and the abnormal returns gained by acquirers. Specifically, we 
show that relatively large deferred payments and longer earnout periods are associated with 
higher takeover premia in earnout financed deals, compared to the takeover premia offered in 
comparable single-payment (non-earnout) deals. This suggests that the target firm’s owners in 
an earnout financed acquisition are compensated for sharing the post-acquisition integration 
risk with the acquiring firm by being offered relatively higher premia. In addition, we present 
evidence regarding the presence of a specific rule of thumb that governs the relationship 
between the initial payment in an earnout financed deal and full payment in a comparable non-
earnout financed one: the initial payment in the former group is set to be, on average, at a lower 
level than, or equal to, the full deal payment in the latter group. This suggests that the acquiring 
firms are aware of the ramifications of making high immediate payments to their targets as such 
high payments may distort the incentives of the private target’s owners (often managers) in 
sharing information with the acquirer during the merger evaluation period. 
Moreover, we investigate the abnormal returns gained by acquirers in deals that are 
financed with earnouts versus single-payments (non-earnouts). We find that an increase in the 
premia in non-earnout financed deals is interpreted as a signal of overpayment. On the contrary, 
given that earnout contracts are employed to address information asymmetry issues that may 
destroy the acquisition’s accurate evaluation, the relatively high premium in an earnout 
financed deal is not interpreted by the market as a signal of overpayment. This result is 
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obtainable provided that the receipt of a significant part of the premium is contingent upon the 
target firm satisfying a large set of pre-determined post-acquisition performance requirements 
and perhaps, any valuation error is likely to be corrected at a future time. 
Given the limited availability of private target-specific information in the public domain, we 
rely on the Rosenbaum (2002) sensitivity analysis to quantify what the effect that a missing 
covariate should be on the odds of earnout presence to alter our qualitative conclusions. We 
find that our results are not sensitive to the impact of an omitted or unobserved covariate and 
hence, our conclusions are likely to be consistent in other specifications including a richer set of 
covariates. 
Finally, it is worth noting that our estimates of the earnout’s wealth effects which are 
derived from a UK-based dataset cannot be generalized to other contexts without a detailed 
cross-country empirical investigation. For instance, Lukas and Heimann (2014) find that wealth 
effects of earnout financing relative to lump-sum payments are larger in Germany compared to 
the United States. The authors present this result as evidence that the concentrated ownership 
of German firms relative to the US firms reduces the transaction and monitoring costs of 
earnout contracts in Germany and consequently increases the earnout’s wealth effects. 
Furthermore, the authors find that non-earnout financed deals are not necessarily detrimental 
to the acquiring firms’ shareholders, as evidenced by their positive significant abnormal returns. 
Therefore, before suggesting that our results can be generalized in non-UK contexts, the 
methodology adopted in this article, via which we combine matching and parametric methods 
using firm-specific performance data, needs to be applied in a larger cross-country investigation 
of the wealth effects of payment methods in M&A. 
Overall, our paper adds further emphasis on the usefulness of earnout financing in 
addressing information asymmetry in M&As and in providing a contextual framework that 
allows both the acquiring and the target firms to reap additional benefits from the M&A 
transaction. Finally, the combination of both parametric and non-parametric methods offers a 
robust approach of designing our research strategy in this article, which allows us to gain 
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enough confidence regarding the procedures one should follow when designing earnouts, in 
addition to evaluating the effects of earnout financing on the takeover premia and the abnormal 
returns gained by acquirers. 
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Appendix 1 - Variable definitions 
 
Variable 
(Acronym) 
Description Source 
Acquirer’s Age (AGE) 
The number of days between the acquirer’s listing in Datastream 
and the announcement date. 
Datastream 
Acquirer’s Market-to-
Book Value 
(ACQMTBV) 
The market value of the acquirer at four weeks before the 
acquisition, divided by its book value of equity from the most 
recent accounting statement prior to the bid announcement. 
Datastream 
Audited Profits Before 
Taxes (PBT) 
The target’s Audited Profits Before Taxes for the financial year 
preceding the acquisition as covered in the acquisition 
announcement. 
InvestEgate + Nexis-UK 
Cash Financed 
Transactions (CASH) 
Dummy=1 if the consideration is 100% financed with cash and 0 
otherwise. 
SDC 
Cross-Border 
Acquisition (CBA) 
Dummy=1 when the transaction includes a UK acquirer and non-
UK target and = 0 when the target is a UK firm [= DOM]. 
SDC 
Culture Index 
(CULT_INDEX) 
An index that ranks the countries in which the targets are listed 
from the most flexible to the least flexible, and from the most 
transparent to the least transparent, in dealing with accounting 
and organisational challenges. It takes the following values: 
1. The country of the firm acquired belongs to the Anglo-American 
group. The countries included are: United Kingdom, Canada, the 
Republic of Ireland, United States, New Zealand, South Africa and 
Australia. 
2. The country of the firm acquired belongs to the Nordic group. 
The countries included are: Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Norway 
and Netherlands. 
3. The country of the firm acquired belongs to the Asian-Colonial 
group. The countries included in this case are: Hong Kong and 
Singapore. 
4. The country of the firm acquired belongs to the Germanic group. 
The countries included are: Germany, Austria, Israel and 
Switzerland. 
5. The country of the firm belongs to the remaining groups. The 
underlying assumption in this case is that once high differences in 
the degree of flexibility are reached, the ordering of the accounting 
systems becomes less relevant. 
SDC + The classification provided 
by Gray (1988) in which he uses 
cultural and societal values as 
primary characteristics for 
grouping families of countries. The 
ranking of the flexibility of these 
groups’ accounting systems is 
represented graphically by 
Radebaugh et al. (2006).  
Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns (CAR) 
The sum of the acquirer’s abnormal returns in the 5-day window 
surrounding the announcement 
Datastream 
 Deal Value (DV) 
Reported deal value, in millions of pounds. This value covers the 
initial payment and the maximum value of the reported deferred 
payment when an earnout is included 
SDC 
Earnout (EA) 
Dummy=1 when the consideration includes an earnout [EA] and 0 
otherwise [NEA] 
SDC 
Earnout Value 
(EASIZE) 
Value of the reported maximum earnout size, in million pounds. SDC 
Frequent Bidder 
(FREQ) 
Dummy=1 when the acquirer is classified as a frequent bidder and 
0 otherwise. The acquirers who bid more than the third quartile of 
bid counts per acquirer in the SDC sample of 2797 discussed in 
Section 2 (9 bids) are classified as frequent bidders. 
SDC 
High Relative Size of the 
Deal 
(DUMMYRS) 
Dummy=1 if the deal value relative to the market value of the 
acquirer’s market value is higher than the third quartile of 17%. 
SDC 
Initial Payment in 
Earnout Financed Deals 
(INITIALPMT) 
The value of the initial payment in earnout financed deals. SDC 
Length of the Earnout 
Period 
(LENGTH) 
The length of the earnout period in months as present in the 
acquisition announcement. When no earnout is present, this 
variable takes the value of 0. When an earnout is present and the 
acquisition announcement refers to the auditing of the target’s 
account without mentioning the length of the Earnout period we 
give this variable a value of 1. 
Nexis-UK + InvestEgate 
Market Value of the 
Acquirer’s Equity (MV) 
Acquirer’s market value of equity at four weeks prior to bid 
announcement, in millions of pounds. We also employ the natural 
logarithm of this variable. 
Datastream 
 
Continued 
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Natural Logarithm of 
the Deal Value for Non-
Earnout Financed 
Transactions and the 
Initial Payments in 
Earnout Financed 
Transactions, Divided 
by The target’s Profits 
Before Taxes 
(INITIALDV) 
A continuous variable that is equal to the deal value when an 
earnout is not included and equal only to the initial payment when 
the earnout is included, divided by the target’s pre-acquisition 
profitability. This variable is appropriately defined in Section 3. 
SDC 
Percentage of the Deal 
Payment Financed With 
Stocks (STOCK_PERC)  
The percentage of the total transaction value financed with stocks. SDC 
Positive Profits Before 
Taxes 
(POSPBT) 
The audited value of the profit-before taxes of the target for the 
financial year preceding the acquisition. As this measure is used in 
calculating acquisition multiples, we only include transaction in 
which this measure has a positive value. 
Nexis-UK + InvestEgate 
Premium Offered to the 
Target 
(PREMIUM) 
The ratio of the deal value to the target’s pre-acquisition 
profitability 
SDC + Nexis-UK + InvestEgate 
Propensity Score 
(PROP_SCORE) 
The propensity scores estimated by the Logistic model in Table 3 SDC + Nexis-UK + InvestEgate 
Relative Size of the Deal 
(RS) 
Ratio of (DV) to (MV).  Datastream +SDC 
Relative Earnout 
Payment Size 
(REAS) 
The ratio of the maximum size of the deferred payment to overall 
deal value which covers both the initial payment and the 
maximum value of the deferred payment 
SDC 
Stock Financed 
Acquisitions (STOCK) 
Dummy = 1 when the consideration is 100% financed with stocks 
and 0 otherwise. 
SDC 
Transactions financed 
With a Mix of Cash and 
Stocks Without an 
Earnout 
(MIXED)  
Dummy = 1 when the deal is financed with a mix of cash and stock 
excluding earnout and 0 otherwise. 
SDC 
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Table 1: Annual distribution of our sampled deals 
 Panel A Panel B 
YEAR ALL CASH STOCK MIXED EA FULL CBA IND HCR CST MAT MED RTL CPS HT EPW TLC FIN RST 
1996 29 9 0 4 16 28 4 10 0 4 4 1 0 1 6 0 2 0 1 
1997 38 8 4 2 24 37 14 12 1 3 2 3 1 7 6 0 1 1 1 
1998 37 10 0 6 21 37 11 8 0 0 4 2 3 12 7 0 0 1 0 
1999 35 7 2 3 23 35 7 5 0 3 6 2 2 5 10 0 0 2 0 
2000 35 10 0 2 23 35 12 3 1 1 3 4 1 10 11 0 1 0 0 
2001 28 2 0 0 26 28 4 1 0 2 0 3 0 10 9 0 1 2 0 
2002 12 1 0 0 11 12 2 2 1 0 0 2 0 3 1 0 1 2 0 
2003 11 1 0 1 9 10 2 3 1 0 0 4 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 
2004 18 1 0 2 15 18 2 1 0 1 0 6 0 4 3 0 1 1 1 
2005 34 3 0 1 30 33 5 7 6 1 0 2 1 8 5 0 1 3 0 
2006 32 2 0 3 27 31 6 6 1 0 0 2 1 11 10 0 0 1 0 
2007 40 2 1 2 35 40 6 6 1 1 2 4 0 11 9 1 1 4 0 
2008 22 8 0 0 14 22 8 2 1 1 1 1 1 8 4 0 0 3 0 
2009 18 5 0 6 7 18 7 2 0 0 1 2 2 5 3 0 1 1 1 
2010 35 11 1 5 18 30 12 6 1 0 0 4 2 8 8 2 3 1 0 
N 424 80 8 37 299 414 102 74 (50) 14 (12) 17 (9) 23 (5) 42 (37) 14 (6) 104 (72) 94 (77) 3 (2) 13 (10) 22 (18) 4 (1) 
% 100 18.87 1.89 8.73 70.52 97.64 24.06 17.45 3.30 4.01 5.42 9.91 3.30 24.53 22.17 0.71 3.07 5.19 0.94 
 
Note: Panel A represents the annual distribution of private target M&A bids announced by UK public acquirers between January 1st, 1996 and December 31st, 2010. The distribution of the sample is 
presented according to the total number of transactions (ALL), method of payment (earnout-financing (EA) or single-payments settled in cash (CASH), stock (STOCK) or mixes of both (MIXED)), whether 
the acquisition is classified by SDC as a full acquisition (FULL), in which case the acquirer controls 100% of the target once the acquisition becomes effective, and whether the acquisition is classified by SDC 
as a cross-border transaction (CBA) whereby the target is not registered as a UK company. Panel B represents the yearly distribution of private target M&A bids with respect to the target’s sector. The 
sectors, as reported by SDC, are: Industrials (IND), Healthcare (HCR), Consumer Staples (CST), Materials (MAT), Media and Entertainment (MED), Retail (RTL), Consumer Products (CPS), High-Technology 
(HT), Energy and Power (EPW), Telecommunications (TLC), Financials (FIN) and Real Estate (RST). In Panel B and row N, the number in parentheses refers to the number of earnout financed deals in each 
target sector. 
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Table 2: Summary statistics 
 
MV(£m) ACQ_MTBV DV(£m) AGE (days) STOCK_PERC (%) RS 
 
Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. 
ALL 294 71 4 2 13 6 4,833 3,398 12.35 0.0 0.48 0.08 
CASH 323 92 3 2 13 4 6,451 5,323 0.00 0.0 0.17 0.05 
STOCK 228 48 8 2 46 7 1,685 1,140 100 100.0 11.88 0.11 
MIXED 409 51 4 2 9 5 5,968 4,501 33.6 29.3 0.24 0.09 
EA 274 70 4 2 12 6 4,343 2,562 10.6 0.0 0.29 0.09 
NEA 342 77 4 2 14 4 6,003 4,501 16.3 0.0 0.94 0.05 
DOM 227 62 4 2 11 5 4,152 2,284 12.5 0.0 0.54 0.08 
CBA 505 146 4 3 30 20 6,982 5,780 11.6 0.0 0.3 0.07 
 
CULT_IND POSPBT (£m) PREMIUM EASIZE(£m) REAS LENGTH (months) 
 
Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. 
ALL 1.3 1 1.68 0.5 35.09 10.87 - - - - - - 
CASH 1.8 1 3.61 0.48 15.58 7.75 - - - - - - 
STOCK 1.8 1 1.11 0.30 126.05 17.25 - - - - - - 
MIXED 1.6 1 1.04 0.54 23.87 10.14 - - - - - - 
EA 1.2 1 1.26 0.50 39.27 11.75 4.8 2.3 0.36 0.32 19.8 19 
NEA 1.7 1 2.69 0.49 25.11 8.82 - - 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
DOM 1.0 1 1.02 0.44 37.8 10.96 3.8 1.9 0.38 0.33 10.7 1 
CBA 2.4 1 3.78 0.90 26.56 10.17 9.3 4.7 0.29 0.25 15.1 12 
 
Note: This Table represents the mean and median values of a set of continuous covariates in the sample. The covariates are the 
acquirer’s market value (MV), the acquirer’s market-to-book value (ACQ_MTBV), the transaction value (DV) and the bidder’s age 
(AGE). The table also includes the means and medians of the portion of the transaction financed with stocks (STOCK_PERC), the size 
of deal payment relative to the acquirer’s market value (RS), the Culture Index (CULT_IND) defined in Appendix 1, the target’s 
positive Profits-before-Taxes (POSPBT), the premium measured by the variable (PREMIUM) defined in Appendix 1, the size of the 
deferred payment in earnout financed deals (EASIZE), the relative earnout size (REAS) and the length of earnout period (LENGTH). 
These measures are reported for the sample covering all the transactions (ALL), the transactions fully financed with cash (CASH), 
the transactions fully financed with stocks (STOCK), the transactions fully financed with a mix of cash and stock with no inclusion of 
earnouts (MIXED), the transactions financed with earnouts (EA) and the general group of transactions not financed with earnouts 
(NEA). The table also presents the means and medians of these variables based on the geographic scope of the transaction (domestic 
transactions (DOM) and cross-borders transactions (CBA). Please refer to Appendix1 for an accurate description of the variables.
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Table 3: Matching analysis 
 
 
Panel A 
Intercept ln(MV) ln(AGE) FREQ STOCK_PERC CULT_IND CBA DUMMYRS POSPBT 
1.783* 
(0.976) 
0.247** 
(0.104) 
-0.229** 
(0.105) 
0.589* 
(0.324) 
-0.012** 
(0.005) 
-0.302** 
(0.128) 
-0.642* 
(0.337) 
1.037*** 
(0.284) 
-0.013* 
(0.007) 
 
Panel B 
 
 
Before Matching 
  
After Matching 
 
 
Treated 
Group 
Control 
Group 
p-value 
Treated 
Group 
Control 
Group 
p-value 
PROP_SCORE 0.74 0.60 0.01 0.74 0.75 0.75 
STOCK_PERC 10.67 16.35 0.05 10.54 10.19 0.81 
CULT_IND 1.18 1.75 0.00 1.17 1.18 0.86 
CBA 0.18 0.38 0.00 0.18 0.18 0.90 
AGE 4343.80 6003.70 0.00 4396.10 4731.70 0.27 
FREQ 0.27 0.16 0.01 0.26 0.22 0.13 
MV 274 342 0.48 274 266 0.93 
POSPBT 1.26 2.69 0.20 1.26 3.18 0.15 
DUMMYRS 0.54 0.04 0.01 0.54 0.57 0.40 
 
Note: Panel A presents the Logistic model that is used in estimating the propensity scores. The dependent variable (EA) is assigned 
the value of 1 if an earnout is included in the deal’s financing process, and 0 otherwise. The independent variables are: the natural 
logarithms of the acquirer’s market value (ln(MV)) and age (ln(AGE)), the presence of a frequent acquirer (FREQ), the percentage of 
total deal value that is financed with stocks (STOCK_PERC), the Culture Index (CULT_IND), the presence of a foreign target (CBA), 
the presence of relatively large target (DUMMYRS), and the target’s pre-acquisitions positive PBT (POSPBT). Panel B reports the 
outcome of the matching exercise with caliper 0.25. After the matching, the treated and control groups contain, respectively, to 
earnout financed (EA) and non-earnout financed (NEA) deals on the matched sample of 386 observations. For each of the covariates, 
we report the mean in the treated and control group before and after the matching. The Absolute Standardized Mean Difference 
refers to the absolute value of the ratio of the difference between the mean of the variable in the treated group and the mean of this 
variable in the control group, divided by the square root of the mean of the covariate’s variances in both groups. Please refer to 
Appendix 1 for an accurate description of the variables. 
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Table 4: Determinants of the takeover premium  
Model OLS OLS 
Dependent Variable ln(PREMIUM) ln(PREMIUM) 
Explanatory Variables\Model (.) (1) (2) 
Intercept 
1.091*** 
(0.359) 
0.898*** 
(0.351) 
EA 
0.283*** 
(0.111)  
ln(POSPBT) 
-0.594*** 
(0.057) 
-0.577*** 
(0.058) 
ln(MV) 
0.159*** 
(0.036) 
0.160*** 
(0.034) 
ln(AGE) 
0.008 
(0.031) 
0.032 
(0.031) 
CBA 
0.275** 
(0.124) 
0.287** 
(0.125) 
STOCK_PERC 
0.007** 
(0.003) 
0.009*** 
(0.003) 
CULT_IND 
-0.100 
(0.065) 
-0.099 
(0.062) 
FREQ 
-0.093 
(0.090) 
-0.096 
(0.086) 
REAS  
0.645*** 
(0.174) 
LENGTH  
0.006** 
(0.003) 
Year Effects YES YES 
Industry and Cross-Industry Effects YES YES 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.41 0.44 
N 386 386 
P-Value (LR-test) 0.00 0.00 
 
Note: This table represents two models that explain the variation in the premium offered to the private target’s owners. The first 
model puts emphasis on the impact of the presence of earnout financing on the premium while the second model’s emphasis is on 
the impact of the earnout contract’s terms on this premium. The standard errors reported in parentheses are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity using the White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. Variables not included in this table were 
not found to have significant effects. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Please refer to 
Appendix 1 for an accurate description of the variables. 
 36 
Table 5: Multivariate analysis of the earnout’s structure 
Dependent Variable INITALDV INITIALDV 
Explanatory Variable\Model (.) (1) (2) 
Intercept 
0.974*** 
(0.248) 
1.000*** 
(0.286) 
EA 
-0.227** 
(0.106) 
-0.212* 
(0.112) 
ln(MV) 
0.187*** 
(0.039) 
0.193*** 
(0.037) 
STOCK_PERC 
0.011*** 
(0.003) 
0.012*** 
(0.003) 
ln(POSPBT) 
0.455*** 
(0.067) 
0.457*** 
(0.067) 
CBA 
0.371*** 
(0.125) 
0.359*** 
(0.128) 
CULT_IND 
-0.094 
(0.059) 
-0.091 
(0.066) 
Year Effects NO YES 
Industry and Cross-Industry Effects NO YES 
N 386 386 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.40 0.39 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.00 0.00 
 
Note: This table reports the results of the cross-sectional analysis explaining the relationship between the initial payments in 
earnout financed deals and the deal payments in non-earnout financed deals. The dependent variable is INITIALDV is defined in 
Section 3.The standard errors reported in parentheses are corrected for heteroskedasticity using the White (1980) 
heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. Variables not included in this table were not found to have significant effects. ***, **, 
and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Please refer to Appendix 1 for an accurate description of the 
variables. 
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Table 6: Determinants of the announcement period abnormal returns 
Dependent Variable CAR CAR 
Explanatory Variables\Model (.) (1) (2) 
Intercept 
0.036** 
(0.016) 
0.044*** 
(0.017) 
EA 
0.022** 
(0.010) 
0.013 
(0.011) 
ln(MV) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
STOCK_PERC 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
CULT_IND 
0.007* 
(0.004) 
0.007* 
(0.004) 
PREMIUM 
 
-0.0004** 
(0.0002) 
EA × PREMIUM 
 
0.0004** 
(0.0002) 
Year Effects YES YES 
Industry and  
Cross-Industry Effects 
YES YES 
N 386 386 
Adjured R-Squared 0.02 0.04 
Prob (F-Statistic) 0.00 0.00 
 
Note: This table represents the cross-sectional analysis of the public UK acquirers’ CAR in the 5-day period (-2, 2) surrounding the 
acquisition announcement. Model 1 examines the determinants of CAR without introducing the interaction of the premium 
(PREMIUM) with the presence of earnouts (EA). Model 2 examines whether the different interpretations by the market of the 
acquisition premia explains the positive market reaction to the presence of earnouts. The standard errors reported in parentheses 
are corrected for heteroskedasticity using White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. Variables not included in 
this table were included in alternative specifications and were not found to have significant effects. ***, **, and * represent 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Please refer to Appendix 1 for an accurate description of the variables. 
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Table 7: Treatment effect estimates and sensitivity analysis 
Outcome ln(PREMIUM) INITIALDV 
𝐴𝑇𝑇 
(Abadie and Imbens (2006) Standard Errors) 
47.25*** 
(0.07) 
-11.03 
(9.92) 
Cut-off Γ value (p≈0.05) 2.00 1.50 
Cut-off Γ value (p≈0.10) 2.20 1.41 
 
Note: This table represents the outcome of the matching and the Rosenbaum (2002) sensitivity analyses. For both variables, 
ln(PREMIUM) and INITIALDV, we estimate the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) with the Abadie and Imbens (2006) 
standard errors after a 1:1 matching exercise with caliper 0.1. We also present the cut-off Γ levels at which the treatment effects 
become significant at the 5% and 10% levels for ln(PREMIUM) and insignificant for INITIALDV. ***, **, and * represent 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
